Search results for "Prisoner's dilemma"
showing 10 items of 10 documents
Prisoner's dilemma in an RNA virus
1999
The evolution of competitive interactions among viruses1 was studied in the RNA phage φ6 at high and low multiplicities of infection (that is, at high and low ratios of infecting phage to host cells). At high multiplicities, many phage infect and reproduce in the same host cell, whereas at low multiplicities the viruses reproduce mainly as clones. An unexpected result of this study1 was that phage grown at high rates of co-infection increased in fitness initially, but then evolved lowered fitness. Here we show that the fitness of the high-multiplicity phage relative to their ancestors generates a pay-off matrix conforming to the prisoner's dilemma strategy of game theory2,3. In this strateg…
The forager's dilemma: food sharing and food defense as risk-sensitive foraging options.
2003
Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently la…
A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma
2016
We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…
The UN in the Lab
2013
We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Deterrence and Prevention. Deterrence – investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack – generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists, while Prevention – investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack – creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coor…
From ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’ to Reluctance to Use Judicial Discretion: The Enemies of Cooperation in European Cross-Border Cases
2017
This article will focus on Articles 41–44 of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation (Regulation 2015/848) and the dynamic of cooperation and communication between courts and insolvency practitioners. Two main ideas will be maintained. The first is that cooperation requires a legal framework which is certain—otherwise, prescriptions imposing duties of cooperation and communication might produce ‘prisoner's dilemmas’ and, paradoxically, unwillingness to cooperate. The second idea is that prescriptions imposing duties of cooperation and communication have an intrinsic open texture—this characteristic ontologically requires courts and insolvency practitioners to make choices between differen…
Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift.
2017
[EN] The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner s Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinear…
REPEATED GAMES WITH PROBABILISTIC HORIZON
2005
Repeated games with probabilistic horizon are defined as those games where players have a common probability structure over the length of the game's repetition, T. In particular, for each t, they assign a probability pt to the event that "the game ends in period t". In this framework we analyze Generalized Prisoners' Dilemma games in both finite stage and differentiable stage games. Our construction shows that it is possible to reach cooperative equilibria under some conditions on the distribution of the discrete random variable T even if the expected length of the game is finite. More precisely, we completely characterize the existence of sub-game perfect cooperative equilibria in finite s…
Religion, Empathy, and Cooperation: A Case Study in the Promises and Challenges of Modeling and Simulation
2019
The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is developing a sophisticated naturalistic account of religion, grounded in empirical research. However, there are limitations to establishing an empirical basis for theories about religion’s role in human evolution. Computer modeling and simulation offers a way to address this experimental constraint. A case study in this approach was conducted on a key theory within CSR that recently has come under serious challenge: the Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis, which posits religion facilitated the shift from small, homogeneous social units to large, complex societies. It has been proposed that incorporating empathy as a proximate mechanism for cooperati…
Human cooperation in groups: variation begets variation
2015
Open Access Published: 04 November 2015 Human cooperation in groups: variation begets variation Pieter van den Berg, Lucas Molleman, Jaakko Junikka, Mikael Puurtinen & Franz J. Weissing Scientific Reports volume 5, Article number: 16144 (2015) Cite this article 383 Accesses 4 Citations 6 Altmetric Metricsdetails Abstract Many experiments on human cooperation have revealed that individuals differ systematically in their tendency to cooperate with others. It has also been shown that individuals condition their behaviour on the overall cooperation level of their peers. Yet, little is known about how individuals respond to heterogeneity in cooperativeness in their neighbourhood. Here, we presen…
Building emotional agents for strategic decision making
2015
Experimental economics has many works that demonstrate the influence of emotions and affective issues on the process of human strategic decision making. Personality, emotions and mood produce biases on what would be considered the strategic solution (Nash equilibrium) to many games. %CAMBIO% Thus considering these issues on simulations of human behavior may produce results more aligned with real situations. We think that computational agents are a suitable %CAMBIO% technology to simulate such phenomena. We propose to use O3A, an Open Affective Agent Architecture to model rational and affective agents, in order to perform simulations where agents must take decisions as close as possible to h…